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I. INTRODUCTION

I want better treatment from employers to ensure the minimum wage. I feel like
I'm killing myself. Every day I'm working harder and harder and making less, and
it seems to me I'm running out of strength....
We come here and they treat us like dogs. I'm always scared. The supervisor yells
and screams at me and I start remembering the others who were worse. I'm
traumatized when I see them yelling and screaming. When the (supervisor yells], I
immediately start shaking because I am very scared. Sometimes I get very, very
desperate but I know I have to keep up the struggle because I have children. We
suffer a lot in this country, too much. We will continue to struggle, see if we can
get ahead.
I keep on struggling so my kids will have a better life and won't end up like me as
a presser (working an industrial iron]. That's all I want.
-"Aracely,"

female laborer in a sweatshop in Los Angeles's garment industry.'

Like Aracely, the workers in sweatshops in America's garment industry commonly

* Associate, Kiel Ellis & Boxer, Springfield, Vermont; J.D., 2002, Indiana University

School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1999, Indiana University-Bloomington. I thank
Professor Julia Lamber for her guidance and advice on this Article. I also thank my family for
their love and support. Finally, I thank Christine Popp for her love and for inspiring me to write
this Article.
1.Jo-Ann Mort, "They Want to Kill Usfor a Little Money": Sweatshop Workers Speak Out,
in No SWEAT: FASHION, FREE TRADE, AND THE RIGHTS OF GARMENT WORKERS 193, 195

(Andrew Ross ed., 1997).
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work far more than forty hours per week without receiving overtime pay. 2 Infact,
overtime pay is just a secondary concern, because most sweatshop employees earn far
below minimum wage to begin with.3 Workers' supervisors are so strict that they often
prevent their employees from using the bathroom during entire shifts.4 Many female
workers cannot become pregnant for fear of losing their jobs. 5 Supervisors treat
employees so harshly that women often must return to work sooner than two weeks
after giving birth, even by painful Caesarian section, or face termination. 6
Many factors could explain the cause of the horrible conditions found in the U.S.
garment industry: the workers are poor,7 the workers are minorities,8 the workers are
often immigrants, 9 and the workers are often in the country illegally.' 0 One factor that
must not be overlooked, however, is that the workers arefemale.'1 The horror stories
recounted in the previous paragraph make it clear that workers in the garment industry
receive poorer treatment because of their sex.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment "discriminat[ion]
...because of... sex."' 2 As such, one might think that the above-described improper
treatment of women in the garment industry logically should fall within Title VII's
ambit. However, courts interpreting the Supreme Court's current Title VII doctrine
may not reach this conclusion quite so easily.

2. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
7. Dennis Hayashi, Preventing Human Rights Abuses in the U.S. Garment Industry: A
ProposedAmendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 17 YALE J.INT'L L. 195, 195, 200
(1992); Leo L. Lam, DesignerDuty: Extending Liability to Manufacturersfor Violations of
Labor Standards in GarmentIndustry Sweatshops, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 623, 632 (1992).
8. Hayashi, supranote 7, at 195, 200; Lam, supra note 7, at 632; see Center for Economic
and Social Rights, "Treated Like Slaves": Donna Karan, Inc. Violates Women Workers'
Human Rights 2 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter CESR], at http://www.cesr.org/text%20files/

dknyrep2.PDF (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).
9. MIRIAM CHING YOONLOUIE, SWEATSHOP WARRIORS: IMMIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS TAKE

32-33 (2001); Steve Nutter, The Structure and Growth of the Los
Angeles GarmentIndustry, in No SWEAT: FASHION, FREE TRADE, AND THE RIGHTS OF GARMENT
WORKERS 199, 206-07 (Andrew Ross ed., 1997); Andrew Ross, Introduction to No SWEAT:
FASHION, FREE TRADE, AND THE RIGHTS OF GARMENT WORKERS 24 (Andrew Ross ed., 1997);
Elizabeth Weiner & Hardy Green, A Stitch in Our Time: New York's Hispanic Garment
Workers in the 1980s, in A NEEDLE, A BOBBIN, ASTRIKE: WOMEN NEEDLEWORKERS INAMERICA
ON THE GLOBAL FACTORY

279 (Joan M. Jensen & Sue Davidson eds., 1984); Hayashi, supra note 7, at 200; Barbara E.
Koh, AlterationsNeeded: A Study of the Disjunction Between the Legal Scheme and Chinatown
Garment Workers, 36 STAN. L. REV. 825, 828 (1984); Lam, supra note 7, at 632.
10. Nutter, supra note 9, at 207; Hayashi, supra note 7, at 200; Lam, supra note 7, at 632.
11. LOUIE, supra note 9, at 4, 32-33; Nutter, supra note 9, at 206; Ross, supranote 9, at 15,
24; Weiner & Green, supra note 9, at 278; Hayashi, supra note 7, at 195, 200; Koh, supra note
9, at 828; Lam, supra note 7, at 632; CESR, supra note 8, at 2, 6.
12. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (2000).
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The Supreme Court last examined the meaning of the phrase "discriminat[ion] ...
because of ...sex" in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.' 3 Since Oncale,
the lower courts have faced the task of defining the outer parameters of what acts
qualify as "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex."'14 These courts must set these
limits because they must decide who may sue whom; a lower court must know whether
a plaintiff has stated a recognizable cause of action.' 5 Therefore, a lower court might
understand alleged conduct of a "sexual" nature to be based on sex, while the same
court might view conduct of a "gender bias" (or less "sexual") nature to not be based
on sex. 16 Courts draw these lines in an attempt to follow the Supreme Court's mandate

13. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
14. See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000); Newtown v. Shell Oil Co.,
52 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Conn. 1999); Young v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d
921 (S.D. Tex. 1998); see infra Part III.A (discussing Newtown, Young, and then Holman).
15. For example, a Seventh Circuit case interpreting "discriminat[ion] ...because of...
sex" after Oncale ruled that a supervisor cannot sexually harass both a male and a female

employee at the same time because, by treating both plaintiffs badly, he cannot discriminate
against either of them because of their sex. See Holman, 211 F.3d at 403; see infra Part III.A
(discussing Holman in further detail).
16. Throughout this Article, the author will refer to acts of a "sexual" versus a "nonsexual"
nature. The idea of conduct of a "sexual"/"nonsexual" nature derives from the works of legal
scholars such as Katherine M. Franke and Vicki Schultz. See Katherine M. Franke, What's
Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997); Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment,107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
[T]he Supreme Court recognized two kinds of sexual harassment, quid pro quo
and hostile environment harassment. In fact, there are three kinds of sex
harassment: (1) quid pro quo harassment, which by definition is sexual in nature;
(2) hostile environment sexual harassment, whereby the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant engaged in unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that created an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment; and (3) hostile work

environment sex harassment, in which the plaintiff alleges that, because of the
plaintiff's sex, the defendant engaged in nonsexual conduct that created an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
With regard to the last two kinds of harassment, the law distinguishes between
sexually oriented harassment and sex-based harassment, sometimes called genderbased harassment. Although in principle the former is a subset of the latter, courts
for the most part have treated them independently. Most courts have been willing
to recognize claims for sexual harassment based upon either conduct that is sexual
in nature or conduct that creates a hostile environment but is nonsexual in its
content.
Franke, supra, at 716-17 (emphasis added). These scholars believe that courts often "operat[e]

under too narrow a view of sexual harassment"-that is, "courts have placed too much emphasis
on the 'sexual' aspect of sexual harassment claims" and "courts often ignore [claims based on]
nonsexual conduct." Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment
Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 580 (2001) (discussing the work of Professors Franke and
Schultz).
According to these scholars, conduct of a "sexual" nature includes sexual "remarks,
touching, or display of pornographic pictures," Franke, supra, at 723 (quoting Vondeventer v.
Wabash Nat. Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. Ind. 1995)), unwanted sexual advances,
Schultz, supra, at 1686, 1717, sexual jokes, id. at 1717, "'requests for sexual favors,"' id.

1022

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 78:1019

in Oncale17 for lower courts to recognize only those claims based on "discriminat[ion]
...because of... sex."
This Article argues that courts should not construct such artificial boundaries
against a claim for sexual harassment. Courts currently adhere to an understanding of
"discriminat[ion] ...
because of... sex" that focuses primarily on the "sexual" aspects
of sex.' 8 However, the phrase "discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex" is wonderfully
bland, generic, and open to a myriad of interpretations-and this is how it should be.
Courts should embrace a broad interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ...because of...

sex" that would recognize causes of action that have any connection with the idea of
"sex"-whether that is sex in a sexuality sense, a gender inequity sense, a perpetuation
9
of gender stereotypes sense, or an enforcement of gender norms sense.'

(quoting EEOC GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(1983)), "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature," id., or conduct based on sexual desire,
id. at 1689, 1692. By contrast, conduct of a "nonsexual" nature includes conduct designed to
"perpetuate[], enforce[], and police[] a set of gender norms that seek to feminize women and
masculinize men," Franke, supra, at 696, conduct designed to put women "in their 'proper
place,"' id., conduct that "violates formal equality principles," id. at 705, conduct that
"subordinates women to men," id. at 725-26, or conduct that undermines women's competence
in the workplace, Schultz, supra,at 1687. Examples of "nonsexual" sexual harassment include:
characterizing the work as appropriate for men only; denigrating women's
performance or ability to master the job; providing patronizing forms of help in
performing the job; withholding the training, information, or opportunity to learn
to do the job well; engaging in deliberate work sabotage; providing sexist
evaluations of women's performance or denying them deserved promotions;
isolating women from the social networks that confer a sense of belonging;
denying women the perks or privileges that are required for success; assigning
women sex-stereotyped service tasks that lie outside their job descriptions (such as
cleaning or serving coffee); engaging in taunting, pranks, and other forms of
hazing designed to remind women that they are different and out of place; and
physically assaulting or threatening to assault the women who dare to fight back.

Id.
The remainder of this Article will refer to these two different types of conduct using the
shorthand notations of "sexual" and "nonsexual." Additionally, the terms "gender-based
harassment" or "gender discrimination" will be used to describe conduct designed to
discriminate or degrade women in a nonsexual manner.
17. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78-82.
18. See Franke, supra note 16, at 716-18; Juliano & Schwab, supra note 16, at 580-82;
Schultz, supranote 16, at 1689. Professors Juliano and Schwab performed an empirical study to
test the theories of other legal scholars who argued that courts place too much emphasis on the
sexual aspects of a sexual harassment claim. Their findings "support the arguments of Schultz
and Abrams that courts are not including nonphysical, nonsexual harassment within the scope of
sexual harassment. In cases in which plaintiffs alleged less favorable work assignments, for
example, plaintiffs were significantly less successful than plaintiffs alleging requests for sexual
favors." Juliano & Schwab, supra note 16, at 581.
19. This Article, in Part V, proposes a new model for a broader interpretation of
"discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex." The model categorizes a broad range of conduct as
conduct that could constitute "discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex" for Title VII purposes.
The model incorporates theories of discrimination postulated in previous scholarly works as
examples of the conduct that this model would recognize as "discriminat[ion] ...
because of...
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Courts need a broader interpretation of "discriminat[ion]... because of... sex"
because many causes of action that one could logically interpret as sexual
harassment-including the above-described harassment against women in the garment
industry-might remain unrecognizable under the judiciary's current "sexual"-focused
interpretation of a valid cause of action. By focusing on the "sexual" aspects of
"discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex," courts often overlook causes of action based
on unequal treatment of women in the workplace, reinforcement of gender stereotypes,
or subordination of female employees .20 For instance, nothing in the above descriptions
of sweatshop abuses falls within the "sexual" understanding of "discriminat[ion]...
because of... sex." In those examples, the female employees were not propositioned
for sex, teased in a sexual manner, fondled, flirted with, or called degrading sexual
epithets. Nonetheless, some of the aspects of the treatment of these women arose
because of sex-strictly because they were women. A narrow, "sexual"-based
interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex" by a court might preclude
these women from submitting a recognizable cause of action for sexual harassment.
Furthermore, women in the garment industry face an additional textual hurdle in the
wake of the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ... because of
... sex." The Oncale Court stated that:
Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is
directed only at "discriminatfion] ... because of... sex." We have never held
that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is
automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have
sexual content or connotations. "The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or' 2conditions
of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. 1
Some lower courts have latched onto the Supreme Court's idea of differing treatment
between the sexes from the preceding sentence, and these courts have used this idea to
preclude claims brought by plaintiffs who endured sexual harassment, but who could
not show that members of the opposite sex were treated differently. 22 It is not
unreasonable, however, to picture a sweatshop composed entirely of female workers.23
In this situation, female plaintiffs could never prove that they have been exposed to

sex"; this Article refers to these theories of discrimination using the language of the previous
legal works. For example, Professor Franke used terms such as "gender stereotypes" and
"gender norms," as are shown in the accompanying text. Franke, supra note 16, at 693.
20. See Franke, supra note 16, at 716-18; Juliano & Schwab, supra note 16, at 580-82;
Schultz, supra note 16, at 1689.
21. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993))
(emphasis in original).
22. See infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text (discussing the "equal opportunity
harasser" cases).
23. The majority of garment industry operations are small setups in urban locations. Lam,
supra note 7, at 628. The vast majority of garment industry laborers are female. CESR, supra
note 8, at 2 (estimating that women make up 70% of the workers in the U.S. garment industry).
This combination implies that a sweatshop composed entirely of female workers is completely
realistic. For example, see id. at 11, which describes the "Choe factory" in New York's
Manhattan fashion district, a seventy-worker factory "manned" entirely by women.
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conditions of employment to which men are not exposed, because there are no men on
their jobs. Therefore, these women conceivably could not establish the more traditional
"gender inequality" cause of action under Title VII. 24 They cannot prove unequal
treatment of the sexes, but they can prove that they have faced harsher working
conditions because of their sex.2 5 Thus, they deserve Title VII's protection.
For various reasons discussed herein, the average sweatshop worker may refuse to
pursue a litigation right through the judicial system. 26 However, a broader
interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex" would ensure that female
sweatshop workers would at least enjoy the option to pursue a powerful cause of action
to redress the wrongs inflicted against them by their employers.
In arguing that courts should interpret "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex"
more broadly, this Article, in Part II, will begin by describing the atrocities facing
female workers in the United States' garment industry. Next, Part III will examine
cases that followed Oncale in order to highlight inconsistencies in the ways that lower
courts interpret "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex." This Part argues that courts
currently understand "because of ... sex" in inconsistent and underinclusive manners;
thus, a new interpretation is needed. Then, Part IV will discuss why some deserving
plaintiffs, including female sweatshop workers, need a broader interpretation of
"discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex." Finally, Part V will suggest how the
judiciary could implement a broader interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ... because
of... sex."
II.

SWEATSHOP CONDrrIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

27

Garment retailers and manufacturers in the United States control a very large and
profitable industry.28 Profits from manufacturing the clothing we wear soar into the

24. "By targeting discrimination, or different treatment, because of membership in a
protected class, Title VII aims to identify and then remedy those employment practices that
illegitimately take into account race, color, religion, national origin, or sex." Franke, supra note
16, at 706. Thus, Title VII prohibits conduct of any nature that treats two individuals differently
because of their sex. See id. Furthermore, Professor Franke explained that courts first
understood that "[s]exual harassment is sex discrimination because it violates formal equality
principles." Id. at 705-14.
25. In fact, the harassment described above is perhaps more pernicious and destructive to
women than the "sexual" sexual harassment that courts readily recognize.
26. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
27. Statistics on sweatshops are inherently inaccurate and incomplete, see Lam, supra note 7,
at 623 n.7, because sweatshops, by their very nature, are often underground operations that
"regularly violate[] both wage or child labor and safety or health laws." Id. at 623 (quoting U.S.
GEN. ACCT. OFF., "SWEATSHOPS" IN NEW YORK CITY: A LOCAL EXAMPLE OF A NATIONWIDE
PROBLEM, BRIEFING REPORT TO THE HONORABLE CHARLES E. SCHUMER, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES/UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 1 (GAO/HRD-89-101BR,

1989)); see also Weiner & Green, supra note 9, at 279 (describing the garment industry as "a
two-tiered industry: a legitimate sector and an 'underground' sector").
28. The garment industry is set up in a "pyramid structure." See; CESR, supra note 8, at 2-5;
Hayashi, supra note 7, at 198-200; Koh, supra note 9, at 827-28; Lam, supranote 7, at 629-31;
LOUIE, supra note 9, at 4-5. "Retailers," large corporations like Nordstrom, Macy's,
Bloomingdale's, Wal-Mart, and K-Mart that sell the clothes to customers, make up the top of
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billions of dollars each year. 29 The majority of the production of clothing in the United
States takes place in large metropolitan areas 3°-New York, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco house the largest garment industries 3 1-with
many individual cities
operating billion-dollar industries in their own right.32 Yet many of the garment
industry's million-plus employees 33 toil under some of the most appalling working
conditions existent in the United States.
Although the garment industry is large, individual shops where clothing is made are
typically quite small. 34 Large garment manufacturers-like Levi-Strauss, DKNY, Gap,

the pyramid. CESR, supra note 8, at 3; Lam, supra note 7, at 629; LOUIE, supra note 9, at 4-5.
Below retailers are the "manufactures," the brand names like Levi-Strauss, DKNY, Liz
Claiborne, Gap, and Esprit, who design clothing, but who often do not assemble the clothing
themselves. CESR, supra note 8, at 3-4; Hayashi, supra note 7, at 199; Koh, supra note 9, at
827; Lam, supra note 7, at 629-31; LOUIE, supra note 9, at 4-5, 33. Instead, the manufacturers
often "contract out" much of their work to individual shop owners, or "contractors," who
actually produce the clothing and ship it back to the manufacturer. CESR, supra note 8, at 4;
Hayashi, supra note 7, at 199-200; Koh, supra note 9, at 827-28; Lam, supra note 7, at 629-31;
LOUIE, supra note 9, at 4-5. At the bottom of the pyramid lie the oft-exploited "garment
workers," who work for the shop owners performing the actual sewing. CESR, supranote 8, at
2-3; Hayashi, supranote 7, at 200; Koh, supra note 9, at 828-29; Lam, supra note 7, at 629-31;
LOUIE, supra note 9, at 4-5.
"This pyramid structure is no accident: It was created by retailers and manufacturers to reap
the benefits of cheap labor, without having to assume legal or moral responsibility for
sweatshop conditions that can result." CESR, supranote 8, at 4 (quoting Richard P. Appelbaum
& Leonard I. Beerman, Sweatshops Continue, But Nobody Is To Blame, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1999, at 6).
29. Lam, supra note 7, at 627 (noting that "revenues in California alone gross billions of
dollars annually.").
30. Id. at 628.
31. Id.
Apparel sweatshops, however, do not exist only in New York and California; they
exist wherever a large, illegal alien workforce is willing to work for sub-minimum
wages. Labor officials have inspected and reported sweatshops in a wide range of
cities such as Chicago, Dallas, Miami, and Washington, D.C., each of which is
home to a substantial immigrant population.
Id. at 635 (internal quotation omitted).
32. Id. at 627 n.29 ("The San Francisco area itself has a five-billion-dollar-a-year industry,
employing over 10,000 workers, most of whom are Chinese women."); CESR, supra note 8, at
5 (explaining that New York City's "$20 billion apparel industry is NYC's largest, and
considered the backbone of New York City's industrial base.") (internal quotation omitted); see
also LOUIE, supra note 9, at 33 (describing the size of Los Angeles's and San Francisco's
garment industries); Nutter, supra note 9, at 199-200 (The apparel industry in the Greater Los
Angeles area "is now a big fish in an even bigger pond-the largest manufacturing industry in
the leading manufacturing county in the United States.").
33. CESR, supra note 8, at 2; Lam, supra note 7, at 628.
34. CESR, supra note 8, at 5 ("Eighty percent of apparel businesses in the [Manhattan]
Fashion District employ 20 or fewer people."); Koh, supranote 9, at 828; Lam, supra note 7, at
623, 635 n.70 ("The Census Bureau in 1982 estimated that over 40% of the domestic apparel
shops employed fewer than 10 persons."); Nutter, supra note 9, at 199, 204 ("Most contractors
in Los Angeles are small, employing less than fifty workers. The average shop has about twentyfive workers and performs sewing assembly and finishing only."); Weiner & Green, supra note
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Esprit, and Liz Claiborne 35 -normally "contract out" work to small, individual sewing
shop owners, and these small contractors actually produce the clothes. 36 However, the
large corporations hold a considerable power imbalance over the multitude of
competing small contractors, and, as a result, the corporations usually negotiate very
favorable contract terms.37 The small shop owners are forced to operate their shops on
the slimmest of budgets, and they in turn pass this economic hardship on to their
employees
in the form of substandard working conditions. 38 Hence, the "sweatshop" is
39
born.

Women of ethnic minorities and immigrant women (both legal and illegal) make up
an extremely disproportionate percentage of the garment industry's workforce.4 °
Sweatshop employers, who are predominantly men,4' seek out these women because
they are an easily exploitable labor source.42 For example, shop owners utilize a
"piecework wage system" to avoid paying the mandatory minimum wage,43 and shop
44
owners have developed a "homework" scheme to skirt the mandatory overtime laws.
Although the federal minimum wage is $5.15 per hour,45 workers in the piecework

9, at 281.
35. See CESR, supra note 8, at 3-4; Hayashi, supra note 7, at 199 n.27; Koh, supra note 9,
at 827; Lam, supra note 7, at 629; LOUIE, supra note 9, at 33.
36. LOUIE, supra note 9, at 4-5; Hayashi, supra note 7, at 199-200; Koh, supra note 9, at

827; Lam, supra note 7, at 629-30; see CESR, supra note 8, at 2-5.
37. LOUIE, supra note 9, at 4; Weiner & Green, supranote 9, at 282; Hayashi, supranote 7,
at 199-200; Koh, supra note 9, at 827-28; Lam, supra note 7, at 630; see CESR, supra note 8, at

2-5.
38. LOUIE, supra note 9, at 4; Weiner &Green, supra note 9, at 279, 282; Hayashi, supra
note 7, at 199-200; Lam, supra note 7, at 630-31; see CESR, supra note 8, at 2-5.

39. A sweatshop is any "small manufacturing establishment employing workers under unfair
and unsanitary conditions." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2308 (1981).
40. CESR, supra note 8, at 2, 6; Hayashi, supra note 7, at 195, 200; Koh, supra note 9, at
828; Lam, supra note 7, at 632;. Nutter, supra note 9, at 206; Ross, supra note 9, at 15, 24.
41. See LOUIE, supra note 9, at 4; Altagracia Ortiz, "En ]a aguja y el pedal ech6 ia hie":
Puerto Rican Women in the Garment Industry of New York City 1920-1980, in PUERTO RICAN
WOMEN AND WORK: BRIDGES IN TRANSNATIONAL LABOR 55, 73 (Altagracia Ortiz ed., 1996).
42. See Hayashi, supra note 7, at 200; Lam, supra note 7, at 632.
43. See CESR, supra note 8, at 8; Hayashi, supra note 7, at 202; Koh, supranote 9, at 82829; Lam, supranote 7, at 635-36; LOUIE, supra note 9, at 34-35; Nutter, supra note 9, at 209;
Weiner & Green, supranote 9, at 283. Under the piecework system, workers receive pay based
on the number of pieces they complete rather than the number of hours they work. Hayashi,
supra note 7, at 202; Lam, supra note 7, at 635-36. Although employers claim that the
piecework system provides incentives for workers to be more productive, in actuality, employers
use the system to avoid paying the hourly minimum wage. Hayashi, supra note 7, at 202; Lam,
supra note 7, at 636.
44. See; CESR, supranote 8, at 8; Hayashi, supranote 7, at 198; Lam, supra note 7, at 63637; LOUIE, supra note 9, at 33-34; Nutter, supra note 9, at 209. "Homework" refers to the
practice of sending workers home after a full day at the sewing shop with additional garments to
complete that night at home. Lam, supra note 7, at 636; see Nutter, supra note 9, at 209. This
practice provides a means for employers to avoid reporting the number of hours that their
employees truly work, thus avoiding the appearance of violations of mandatory overtime laws.
Lam, supra note 7, at 636; see Nutter, supra note 9, at 209.
45. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994).
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wage system can take home as little as $2 per hour (or less); 46 likewise, workers who
work over forty hours per week should receive overtime, 47 but the homework system
often requires workers to log sixty to eighty hour weeks and "overtime is rarely
paid. 48
More shocking than the low wages and long hours, however, are the workplace
conditions encountered by sweatshop employees. Women in sweatshops often toil
under dark, damp, hot, unsafe, and unsanitary conditions. 49 Because the small-time
shop owners operate on such threadbare budgets, employees often work in cramped
workspaces with poor ventilation, locked exits, electrical wiring violations, and other
fire and health hazards.50 Bathroom facilities may be wretched with stench and filth.5 1
Workers also face potential disease spreading factors, such as infestations of rats in the
factory 52 or the use of unsafe equipment ("guns" that attach tags to clothing) that could
spread HIV or hepatitis.53
Furthermore, the shop owners all too often ensure that their employees accept these
terrible working environments through a scheme of systematic harassment and
degradation. 54 Employers want as much production as possible from their employees
during their shifts, so the employers prohibit their employees from taking breaks,
including breaks to use the bathroom. 55 Workers recount stories of supervisors forcing
them to work entire shifts without going to the bathroom, "unless they had finished
stitching their quota." 56 The very condition of the restroom facilities may be degrading:
one worker reported that "[t]he bathrooms are outside on our floor.... Almost no one
goes to the bathroom, they feel embarrassed. 57
Supervisors, pressured to fulfill the terms of difficult contracts with corporate
manufacturers, constantly harass their employees to work faster. 58 Workers also feel
pressure to survive under the piecework wage system, which fosters "self-exploitation
and competition between workers.,, 59 As a result, sick days or maternity leave are
unthinkable for most sweatshop employees. 60 "[T]aking a sick day or maternity leave

46. CESR, supra note 8, at 8; Hayashi, supra note 7, at 202; Lam, supra note 7, at 636;
Ross, supra note 9, at 12-13; see LouIE, supra note 9, at 34-35; Nutter, supra note 9, at 209.
47. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1994); Koh, supra note 9, at 831.
48. CESR, supra note 8, at 8-9; see Hayashi, supranote 7, at 202; Koh, supra note 9, at 831,
831 n.32; Lam, supra note 7, at 636; LOUIE, supra note 9, at 33; Nutter, supra note 9, at 209.
49. CESR, supranote 8, at 9; Hayashi, supra note 7, at 201; Lam, supra note 7, at 633-34;
Ortiz, supra note 41, at 62.
50. CESR, supra note 8, at 9; Lam, supranote 7, at 633-34; Nutter, supra note 9, at 208-09;
Ortiz, supra note 41, at 62.
51. Mort, supra note 1, at 193.
52. Id. at 196.
53. Nutter, supra note 9, at 210.
54. Id. at 209; Ross, supra note 9, at 10; CESR, supra note 8, at 9.
55. Mort, supranote 1, at 196; CESR, supranote 8, at 12-15.
56. CESR, supra note 8, at 12; see Mort, supranote 1, at 196.
57. Lina Rodriguez Mesa, Testimony, in No SWEAT: FASHION, FREE TRADE, AND THE RIGHTS
OF GARMENT WORKERS 5 (Andrew Ross ed., 1997).

58. CESR, supra note 8, at 12, 15 ("Supervisors screamed at [workers] constantly to work
faster and forbade them from looking up.").
59. LOuIE, supra note 9, at 35.
60. CESR, supra note 8, at 13.
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could jeopardize [employees'] job[s] since the boss and supervisors would scream at
them and threaten to fire them on the spot."' 61 One woman working in a sweatshop in
Los Angeles
underwent a C-section, after which the doctor recommended a six-month hiatus.
She returned to work in eight days. She would have been fired otherwise. Another
operation was necessary to stop internal bleeding, brought on by lack of rest. The
boss called the hospital to make sure that she wasn't lying about her illness. Once
again, she was back after eight days-and now, she bleeds often. She is fatigued
by her surgery and the purple veins bursting out of her legs make it difficult to
stand.62
As with minimum wage and overtime laws, the existing laws provide little real
protection for sweatshop workers in need of maternity leave. For instance, under the
Family and Medical Leave Act, eligible workers should receive three months of jobprotected maternity leave. 63 However, women in sweatshops often return to work in
two weeks for fear of losing their jobs. 64
In addition to pressure to work longer or faster, women commonly encounter more
overt forms of harassment. To keep costs down and to prevent workers from
expressing their rights, supervisors routinely physically, sexually, and verbally abuse
65
"Sexual harassment of women is an everyday event in many
their employees.
66
shops."
Furthermore, pressure to work long hours can affect women more harshly than men,
because women often perform the role of primary caregiver. Many female sweatshop
employees lament their inability to spend time with their children. 67 Many poor
mothers experience difficulty in obtaining adequate daycare. 68 As a result, children
often must join their mothers at the factory after school to wait for their mothers to
finish their shifts.69 Women with sick children at home cannot ask for time off to tend
70
to such family emergencies, "since the likelihood of losing their job [is] very high.,
In situations where men join women at the workplace, supervisors commonly assign
work on the basis of gender, with women predictably receiving the lower-paying
assignments. 7'
Rarely are women able to penetrate the domain of men's work. Men are the
cutters, cutting hundreds of layers of fabric at once into pattern pieces. The
aristocrats of apparel workers, cutters are relatively highly paid .... Men are also
pressers, pressing seams and finished garments to prepare them for shipping....

61. Id.
62. Mort, supra note 1, at 194.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000); see CESR, supra note 8, at 21 n.45, 23.
64. See CESR, supra note 8, at 23.
65. Nutter, supra note 9, at 209; Ross, supra note 9, at 10; CESR, supranote 8, at 9, 13-15.
66. Nutter, supra note 9, at 209.

67. See, e.g., Mort, supra note 1, at 193; CESR, supra note 8, at 15.
68. Weiner & Green, supra note 9, at 279, 286; CESR, supra note 8, at 15.
69. Weiner & Green, supra note 9, at 286.
70. CESR, supra note 8, at 15.
71. See Nutter, supra note 9, at 208; Weiner & Green, supra note 9, at 284.
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[W]omen are not considered
strong enough for the hot, heavy irons or the now72
motorized cutting tools.
As is readily apparent, female laborers-the backbone of the garment industryendure severe harassment and gender inequality every day at the workplace. Much of
the harassment described in the foregoing paragraphs did not involve "sexual desire"
or "sexual" conduct, but most of the harassment did occur "because of sex." Only
women can be forced to forgo pregnancy for fear of losing their jobs, not men. Only
women cannot take adequate time from work for maternity leave. Male supervisors
verbally harass and physically abuse female employees to reinforce the women's
position of inferiority at the workplace. Women receive the lesser-paying job
assignments, not men. And no man was ever forced to return to work eight days after a
Caesarian section.
The remainder of this Article argues that the degradation facing women in
sweatshops is not merely a racist or classist form of discrimination; rather, it is a form
of discrimination based on sex. Therefore, it is sexual harassment. These women
deserve Title VII's protection. Title VII will not solve all of the problems endured by
women working in sweatshops, but it could provide a post-termination litigation option
for women who now traditionally assert very few of their rights while still employed.73

72. Weiner & Green, supra note 9, at 284.
73. Workers in sweatshops typically fear repercussions for asserting their rights. Many
employees are recent immigrants or undocumented workers, so they fear deportation if they
were to assert their rights. Hayashi, supra note 7, at 201; Lam, supra note 7, at 640. Even for
nonimmigrant employees, workers fear that voicing their rights will lead to immediate
blacklisting or retaliatory termination. Hayashi, supra note 7, at 201; Lam, supra note 7, at 640.
"Often bosses do not hire workers who are identified as 'troublemakers' for speaking out against
conditions in one factory-a practice that coerces workers to accept conditions without seeking
recourse." CESR, supra note 8, at 9. Furthermore, some recent immigrants are unaware of the
rights they do possess. Koh, supra note 9, at 833-34; Lam, supra note 7, at 640. Workers
sometimes even develop a benevolent relationship with their supervisor, despite the harsh
working conditions, based on cultural ties or feelings of indebtedness for the economic security
that the supervisor provides. Lam, supra note 7, at 640-41; see Koh, supra note 9, at 829.
To complicate matters further, the workers' employers are not the proverbial "deep pocket"
defendants sometimes present in other sexual harassment cases. Oftentimes, the supervisors in a
sweatshop "were formerly garment workers themselves. They open or buy garment shops
because entering the industry is one of the few opportunities for economic advancement
available to them that requires little capital." Hayashi, supra note 7, at 199-200. "Furthermore,
many shop owners who violate wage and hour laws or owe back wages are insolvent. Thus, the
garment worker is further deterred from initiating a lawsuit by the futility of seeking damages
from an insolvent party." Lam, supra note 7, at 643.
Certain commentators have argued forcefully-albeit under the Fair Labor Standards Act
rather than in the Title VII context-that the manufacturers must be held accountable for the
acts of the shop owners, because the manufacturers' favorable contracts force the shop owners
to violate labor laws. See generally Hayashi, supra note 7; Lam, supra note 7. Manufacturers set
up the pyramid structure to insulate themselves from liability for the contactors' treatment of the
sweatshop workers, but, in reality, the manufacturers "dominate[] all aspects of production."
CESR, supranote 8, at 27. Manufacturers "develop[] ... long-term relationship[s]" with shop
owners and they visit the shops every day. See id. at 27-28. Thus, arguably, the manufacturers
should be held accountable for the abuses of the shop owners. See CESR, supra note 8, at 27-
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The following sections explore how courts could reformulate their Title VII doctrine to
provide a cause of action that would cover the undeniably sexual form of harassment
that female sweatshop laborers confront everyday.
III. THE CURRENT MEANING OF "DISCRIMINAT[ION] ...BECAUSE OF... SEX"
This Part explores courts' current interpretations of Title VII's touchstone for
sexual harassment-that is, "discriminat[ion] ...because of ...sex"-and how this

interpretation affects variously situated plaintiffs. Part III.A uncovers logical
inconsistencies hidden in the way that courts apply Title VII. Part III.B then explains
that, apart from creating logical inconsistencies, lower courts' applications of Title VII
are underinclusive: these courts fail to protect certain groups of people who face
discrimination because of sex.
This Part discusses the current state of the law so that Part IV can explain that, like
the deserving plaintiffs in Part III.B, female sweatshop workers may not now possess a
recognizable cause of action under courts' current Title VII doctrines. Part V will then
describe how courts could modify Title VII law to protect these deserving plaintiffs.
A. LogicalInconsistencies
7
In 1964, Title VII prohibited "discriminat[ion] .. .because of... sex.' In

interpreting this statutory phrase, the Supreme Court now recognizes "sexual
75
harassment" as one such form of sex discrimination. The Court also recognizes that
sexual harassment cases may arise in one of two varieties-"quid pro quo" cases or
"hostile work environment" cases. 76 Courts easily reckon that quid pro quo cases occur
"because of... sex," likely due to the inherent "sexual" (as in "sexual desire") nature

28; Hayashi, supra note 7; Lam, supra note 7.
Although granting a Title VII cause of action to sweatshop workers may not solve these
laborers' problems (for the aforementioned reasons), bestowing additional litigation rights on
this oppressed group cannot hurt. Plus, any potential plaintiffs who stand in a deserving position
under a statute's language ought to have access to that statute in the courts. Female sweatshop
laborers stand in such a position. Furthermore, a study of the unique position of sweatshop
workers provides a useful academic exercise designed to convince the judiciary that its current
interpretations of "discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex" are underinclusive. 42 U.S.C.
§2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
75. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("Without question, when a
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex.") (alteration in original); see Franke, supra note 16, at 70204.
76. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993); Meritor,477 U.S. at 6567. "[Q]uid pro quo harassment occurs when submission to sexual conduct is implicitly or
explicitly made a condition of concrete employment benefits." Franke, supra note 16, at 716
n.123 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(l)-(2) (1996)). Hostile work environment sexual
harassment claims arise "(wihen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
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of a quid pro quo claim. 77 Hostile work environment claims, however, present more
difficult line drawing problems for courts that must determine whether the hostile work
environment arose "because of... sex." 78 Courts struggle with this determination79
because not all hostile work environment claims involve aspects of "sexual" conduct;
rather, plaintiffs often pursue claims under the hostile work environment label based on
"behavior that 'merely' subordinates, disrespects, enforces gender norms, or attacks the
competence of women (and men),"80 wherein no sexual 81conduct occurred and the
harasser felt no sexual desire whatsoever for the plaintiff.
With Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.8 2 in 1998, the Supreme Court
weighed in with its own interpretation of the phrase "discriminat[ion] ...
because of..
sex." 87 The Oncale Court encountered a hostile work environment claim brought by a
male plaintiff complaining of the inappropriate acts of his male coworkers.8 4 Mr.
Oncale alleged that his coworkers "subjected [him] to sex-related, humiliating
actions," "physically assaulted [him] in a sexual manner," and "threatened him with
rape. ,,85 The District Court awarded summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
reasoning that "Mr. Oncale, a male, has no cause of action under Title VII for
harassment by male co-workers." 86 The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed, stating
that "nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of...
sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defendant ... are of the same sex.",87 The
Court never explained, however, exactly what discrimination "because of ...sex"
means.
Consequently, the Oncale decision immediately raised questions about the proper
interpretation of the phrase "discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex." Under Oncale,
must a plaintiff prove that his or her harasser participated in "sexual" forms of
harassment in order to prove "discriminat[ion] ...because of ...sex"? Or, could a
plaintiff prove "discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex" by proving that, because of his
or her sex, he or she received "less favorable work assignments, lack of training
opportunities, etc."? 8 8 The Oncale Court listed a few examples, but the Court raised
more questions about its interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ...because of ...sex"
than it answered.89

77. Franke, supra note 16, at 716.
78. See id. at 716-17.
79. "Much of what is harmful to women in the workplace is difficult to construe as sexual in
design." Schultz, supra note 16, at 1689.
80. Juliano & Schwab, supra note 16, at 580.
81. See id. at 580-81 (discussing the works of Professors Bernstein, Franke, Abrams, and
Schultz).
82. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
83. See id. at 78-82.
84. Id. at 77, 79.
85. Id. at 77.
86. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., No. CIV.A.94-1483, 1995
WL 133349, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 1995)).
87. Id. at 79.
88. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 16, at 555 n.32.
89. Indeed, the Oncale Court affirmatively stated that "harassing conduct need not be
motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex," but
this statement merely clarified that a plaintiff need not prove that his harasser wanted to sleep

1032

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 78:1019

When plaintiffs presented hostile work environment claims following Oncale, the
lower courts scrambled to decipher the Supreme Court's true meaning behind
"discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex." The result has been that almost no two

courts interpret this phrase in the same way. Courts continue to draw arbitrary lines
between "sexual" hostile work environment claims and "nonsexual" claims.9" Legal
scholars note that courts often acknowledge claims based on invidiously "sexual"
conduct as "because of ... sex" more readily than "nonsexual" claims based on

subordination or disrespect of women. 91 Thus, courts' interpretations of
"discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex" have created a confusing doctrine that more
readily protects plaintiffs that allege conduct of a sexual nature, when "sexual" sexual
harassment is merely a "subset" of Title VII's overall purpose of eliminating
'92
"employment practices that illegitimately take into account ...[one's] sex.
Courts usually favor claims based on conduct of a "sexual" nature, but courts
struggle so much with the meaning of "discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex" that

they even countermand this trend at times. For example, compare the reasoning in
Newtown v. Shell Oil Co.93 to Young v. HoustonLighting & Power Co.94 In Newtown,
the plaintiff complained that a coworker's abusive behavior caused a hostile working
environment; specifically, the plaintiff alleged that:
1) on one occasion in the fall of 1994, [her coworker] referred to her as a
"wench"; 2) on one occasion in October 1994, [her coworker] called her a "cunt,"
outside of her presence but within the hearing of several other employees who
reported to the plaintiff; and 3) [her coworker] frequently referred to her as
95
"woman" in a derogatory manner ....
The court determined from this allegation that the coworker's harassment occurred
because of sex, and thus the plaintiff's claims progressed past the summary judgment
stage. 96 On the other hand, in Young, the plaintiff's long list of allegations of sexual
harassment read as follows:

with him; that is, a male plaintiff can prove sexual harassment from a male coworker without
proving that his harasser is homosexual. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (emphasis added). In other
words, Oncale's coworkers were capable of harassing Oncale even if they did not desire to have
sex with him. See id. This statement did not, however, address whether, after Oncale, a
harasser's language or conduct must be "sexual" in nature. There is a difference between
"sexual desire" and language or conduct that is "sexual" in nature.
90. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 16, at 580-82.
91. See id. at 577-82 (discussing the works of Professors Bernstein, Franke, Abrams, and
Schultz).
92. Franke, supra note 16, at 706; see id. at 716.
93. 52 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Conn. 1999).
94. 11 F. Supp. 2d 921 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
95. Newtown, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
96. Id. at 372 ("Here, the conduct complained of in the underlying sexual harassment claim
consisted of the use of offensive epithets focusing on plaintiff's sex."). The plaintiff in Newtown
eventually lost her hostile work environment claim on other grounds: at trial, the court ruled
that, as a matter of law, the harassment she faced did not rise to the level of "severely
persuasive" to meet the Supreme Court's standard in Meritor. See Newtown v. Shell Oil Co.,
No. 3:97 CV 0167(GLG), 2000 WL 49357, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 18, 2000).
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(1) the atmosphere at [her employment] includes sexual jokes, "women are
routinely spoken of in terms of being obviously less qualified, more emotionally
out of control, having been promoted because of who they are supposedly having
a sexual relationship with and generally have less value to the company other than
male counterparts"; (2) the male employees talk about the details of their sex lives
and tell jokes that degrade females; ...(4) [her employer] allegedly stopped
hiring women for positions in chemical operations; (5) sexually explicit posters at
watch stations; (6) when Young complained about the lack of small uniforms for
women, she was told (by an unknown person) "girls like to go shopping, you go
shopping"; (7) when Young complained of a co-worker who did not like working
with girls, [her employer] "allowed him to work on his own, actually doing
nothing productive for the company," rather than making him work with women;
and (8) men who are assigned to help the women hang labels will either lose them
or throw them
away each time, causing the women to have to do the job
97
themselves.
The court determined from these allegations that "Young has not established that the
incidents she complains of were based98on her sex," so the court dismissed Young's
claims at the summary judgment stage.
Obviously, the Newtown and Young courts cannot share the same interpretation of
"discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex." Ms. Newtown furthered allegations of a
"gender discrimination" manner. The most "sexual" of Newtown's allegations were the
inherently sexual connotations carried with the words "wench" and "cunt;" Newtown's
allegations principally averred that her coworkers treated her as a second-class
employee because of her sex. Yet, the court believed that this qualified as
"discriminat[ion]... because of... sex" for summary judgment purposes. Ms. Young,
however, furthered allegations based on both "gender discrimination" and "sexual"
conduct. 99 Young certainly alleged that women were treated differently or had their
work sabotaged due to their gender; furthermore, the misconduct that Young alleged
suggested harassment of a "sexual" nature as well.'°° These two courts must view the
phrase "discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex" in different lights-and nothing in
Oncale directed them to do differently.
Moreover, additional support for the theory that courts perversely twist the meaning
of "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex" emerges from the "equal opportunity
harasser" cases. Lower courts continue to struggle to determine whether harassment
occurred "because of... sex" when someone harasses both men and women. 101For
example, in Holman v. Indiana,10 2 the plaintiffs (a husband and wife couple who
worked together) complained that their supervisor harassed Mrs. Holman "by touching
her body, standing too closely to [her], asking her to go to bed with him and making

97. Young, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 932.
98. Id. at 933; see John W. Whitehead, Eleventh Hour Amendment or Serious Business:
Sexual Harassmentand the United States Supreme Court's1997-1998 Term, 71 TEMP. L. REv.
773, 800 (1998).
99. See Whitehead, supra note 98, at 800-02.
100. See id. at 800.
101. See Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protectionfor
Intergroup Solidarity,77 IND. L.J. 63, 82 n.76 (2002).
102. 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000).
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sexist comments and otherwise making [her] work in a sexually hostile work
environment."10 3 The plaintiffs then further alleged that their supervisor "had sexually
harassed [Mr. Holman] by grabbing his head while asking for sexual favors."' 4 The
court held that because the supervisor discriminated against both a man and a woman,
then the impetus of the supervisor's behavior could not have been to discriminate
because of sex-he treated both sexes equally badly. 105 Yet other courts disagree with
this reasoning and allow claims when someone harasses members of both sexes,
because these courts have focused on the "sexual" nature of the harasser's conduct
rather than the lack of discrimination between the genders. 0 6 The courts' conclusions
diverge simply because they interpret "because of

. .

.sex" differently. This is a

problem.
In turn, the reasoning from the cases that require a showing of "sexual" conduct also
clashes directly with the reasoning of the cases that require a showing of different
treatment of the two sexes. For example, in Young, the Court stated that "[m]erely
alleging that women were treated differently than men is insufficient" and "[n]owhere
does [Young] allege the sort of highly offensive 'verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature' required for sexual harassment."' 1 7 Thus, this court focused narrowly on the
lack of "sexual" conduct and excluded the plaintiffs strong allegations of gender
inequality. Conversely, in Holman, the court stated that
because Title VII is premised on eliminating discrimination, inappropriate
conduct that is inflicted on both sexes.., is outside the statute's ambit. Title VII
does not cover the "equal opportunity" or "bisexual" harasser, then, because such
a person is not discriminatingon the basis of sex. He is not treating one sex better
(or worse) than the other; he is treating both sexes the same (albeit badly).'0 8
Thus, this court focused narrowly on the lack of gender discrimination present in the
case and ignored the blatantly "sexual" nature of the Holmans' claims. How can these
two courts be interpreting the same statute and the same Supreme Court precedent?
What sense can prospective plaintiffs make of such conflicting results?
Clearly, courts continue to struggle to follow the Supreme Court's lead in

103. Id. at 401 (quoting Holman v. Indiana, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 911 (N.D. Ind. 1998)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 403-05.
106. See, e.g., Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234,242 (4th Cir. 2000); Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994):
even if Trenkle [the plaintiff's supervisor] used sexual epithets equal in intensity
and in an equally degrading manner against male employees, he cannot thereby
'cure' his conduct toward women.... [W]e do not rule out the possibility that
both men and women working at Showboat have viable claims against Trenkle for
sexual harassment. (emphasis in original).
See generally Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252-55 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that "there
might even be circumstances that are actionable under Title VII when both men and women
suffer sexually discriminatory harms in the same workplace, but for different reasons," but
ultimately ruling against the plaintiff); Zatz, supra note 101, at 82 n.76.
107. Young, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 933 (citing Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714,719 (5th
Cir. 1986).
108. Holman, 211 F.3d at 403 (emphasis in original).
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interpreting "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex" after Oncale. Courts continue to
experience difficulties in the way that they conceptualize "discriminat[ion] ... because
of... sex." The current understandings of the phrase are too unclear and too difficult
for lower courts to apply. Courts conflict with each other while grounding their
decisions on reasoning that vacillates between whether "sexual-based" discrimination
or "gender-based" discrimination will qualify as "discriminat[ion] ... because of...
sex" for a given fact pattern. More concerning, however, is that courts' understandings
of "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex" are often underinclusive--courts exclude
plaintiffs' claims as not based on sex when, logically, sex constitutes a large part of the
plaintiffs' allegations. How, if male employees tell jokes that degrade females and refer
to female coworkers as having less value to the company than their male counterparts
(as they did in Young), can a court determine that the alleged harassment did not occur
because of sex? Why, if a supervisor harasses one female employee, is this
discrimination because of sex; but if the supervisor harasses one female employee and
one male employee, is this not discrimination because of sex (as in Holman)? The
current interpretation lacks clarity; a new interpretation is sorely needed.
B. Real-World Harms
Sexual harassment cases conflict in their interpretations of "discriminat[ion]...
because of ... sex." Courts generate logical inconsistencies when they try to place
strained limits on the outer boundaries of what actions may constitute "discrininat[ion]
...because of ... sex." However, in addition to creating logical inconsistencies,
courts also cause real-world harm when they restrict the outer boundaries of a sex
discrimination suit. Various legal scholars have revealed how a narrow judicial
interpretation of sexual harassment harms many deserving, but currently unprotected,
plaintiffs.
Even before the Supreme Court decided Oncale, legal scholars were asking "What's0
09
Wrong With Sexual Harassment?" and calling for courts to "Reconceptualiz[e]""1
their interpretations of the meaning of Title VII's prohibition against "discriminat[ion]
... because of... sex." Basically, these legal scholars noticed that courts construed
this phrase much too narrowly, thus excluding many deserving plaintiffs from Title
VII's protection. '1
For example, in 1997, Professor Katherine M. Franke analyzed three theories that
attempted to describe why sexual harassment is "discriminat[ion] ... because of...
sex": (1) because sexual harassment violates formal equality principles, (2) because
sexual harassment is sexual, and (3) because sexual harassment subordinates women to
men. 112Unsatisfied with these theories, Franke posited that courts should conceptualize
sexual harassment as "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex" because
it enforces
"gender norms that seek to feminize women and masculinize men." '" 1.
In 1998, right at the time of Oncale, Professor Vicki Schultz argued that courts

109. See Franke, supra note 16, at 691.
110. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1683.
111. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 16, at 580 (discussing the works of Professors
Bernstein, Franke, Abrams, and Schultz).
112. See Franke, supra note 16, at 704-05.
113. Id. at 696.
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currently place too much emphasis on the "sexual" aspects of sexual harassment." 14
Therefore, courts penalize only the most egregious, "sexualized" instances of sexual
harassment." 15 For Schultz, the harm of the "sexual-based" approach is that is excludes
deserving plaintiffs-women who face "nonsexual" or "gender-based" forms of
harassment-from Title VII's protection.1 6 Instead, she argued, courts should construe
any conduct (both sexual and nonsexual) that
undermines women's competence in the
7
workplace as actionable under Title VII."1
Writing before Oncale, Professor Carlin Meyer also warned that, by focusing on the
"sexual" aspects of sexual harassment, courts "misrepresent the causes of gender
inequality." 1 8 To illustrate this point, Meyer chose to discuss the plight of women
attempting to break into traditionally all-male blue-collar jobs.' 19 Women who begin
working in blue-collar jobs certainly face "sexual" sexual harassment, but they also
endure physical and verbal threats, assaults, sabotage of their tools to prevent them
from completing tasks at work, and exclusion from certain jobs altogether. 20 By
focusing primarily on the "sexual," Meyer concluded, courts (and the media covering
the courts) condemn the symptoms, but not the cause of sexual harassment-the cause
is the gender bias felt by men threatened by women intruding into their theretofore allmale domain of blue-collar
work; acting out this anxiety sexually is merely the
2
symptom of this fear.' '
More recently, and much later than Oncale, scholar Noah D. Zatz argued that, if
men show solidarity toward women at their workplace when their supervisors expect
them to act in a discriminatory manner toward the women, and the men in turn receive
harassment from the supervisors, then those men should receive the right to pursue a
Title VII claim in their own right. 122 According to Zatz, "[i]f employers insist that
employees conform to sex- or race-based stereotypes regarding interactions with other
race or sex groups, employment practices enforcing
those stereotypes constitute
123
actionable discrimination because of race or sex."'
All of these scholars uncovered potential problems that loomed ahead because
courts interpreted "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex" too narrowly. Part III.A of
this Article highlighted logical inconsistencies in the current Title VII doctrine, but
these scholars have exhibited specific, real-world ills that derive from an overly narrow
interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex." These scholars all attacked
very similar problems: they recognized a group of people who (undeservingly, in their
minds) stood outside of the protection of Title VII, and they formulated a way that
courts could, in Schultz's words, "reconceptualize" their understanding of

114. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1689.
115. See id. at 1713-21.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 1691-92.
118. Carlin Meyer, Feminism, Work and Sex: Returning to the Gates (1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Zatz, supra note 101. Zatz addresses racial intergroup solidarity as well, but this
Article will focus solely on sex discrimination under Title VII.
123. Id. at 108.
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"discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex" to bring this unprotected group within the
purview of Title VII.
Likewise, this Article spotted another group-female laborers in the garment
industry-that, for various reasons, might now stand unprotected under current Title
VII doctrine. The following Part addresses the reasons why sweatshop workers might
not enjoy a right to a cause of action for sexual harassment under Title VII.
IV. COURTS SHOULD EXPAND THE MEANING OF "DISCRIMINAT[ION]...

BECAUSE OF

...SEX"
Like Franke's and Schultz's women in gender-biased workplaces, like Meyer's
women in blue-collar jobs, and like Zatz's sympathetic third parties, female laborers in
the garment industry qualify as deserving plaintiffs who may not enjoy protection from
the types of harassment they most commonly endure-the "nonsexual" harassment that
nonetheless occurs because of sex. Judges could essentially "lock the courthouse
doors" to sweatshop workers by interpreting Title VII's prohibition against
"discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex" in either of the two most common manners
that judges interpret this phrase: (1) by emphasizing "sexual" conduct and thereby
overlooking "gender-based harassment," 124 or (2) by mandating a showing of different
treatment between the sexes and
thereby overlooking issues of both "sexual" conduct
25
and "gender subordination."'
If courts require a showing of language or conduct of a "sexual" nature for a
plaintiff's allegation to qualify as "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex" in their
jurisdiction-as Professors Franke, Schultz, and Meyer described as the dominant
stance of today's judiciary' 26 -then sweatshop laborers' potential claims of sexual
harassment stand a good chance of failing. Although "sexual" sexual harassment must
certainly occur in sweatshops (as it does in most other work settings), the majority of
the horrors described in Part II derive not from "sexual" language or conduct by
supervisors, but from an invidious form of "nonsexual" harassment that may be more
devastating and pernicious than any unwelcome sexual advances experienced by,
women in more genteel workplaces. Women in sweatshops experience a form of
"gender subordination" sexual harassment that most women probably cannot fathom
experiencing themselves. Constant verbal belittling, threats of physical violence,
restricted bathroom use, two-week maternity leave, assignment to lower paying job
positions, and forced separation from family obligations 27 may not constitute a
"sexual" form of sexual harassment, but, taken together, these acts serve to reinforce
the (often male) supervisor's dominance over his (nearly all female) employees. These
"nonsexual" acts serve to discriminate because of sex-they degrade women and
subordinate them to men. If a court were to refuse to recognize a claim based on these
types of "nonsexual," "gender-based" acts, the court would28not serve to uphold Title
VII's purpose of prohibiting discrimination based on sex.

124. See supra notes 97-100, 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing Young).
125. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text (discussing Holman).
126. See supra Part III.B.
127. See supra Part H.

128. "Title VII's central mission is to dismantle race- and sex-based barriers to full
participation in the American workplace." Zatz, supra note 101, at 69-70.
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Another way a court could fail to stay true to Title VII's purpose would be to
overemphasize the unequal treatment of men and women in its sexual harassment
jurisprudence. If a court required a showing that men and women were literally treated
differently at the workplace (similar to the Holman court), then female sweatshop
workers may not possess a claim, because often, women make up the entire workforce
in a sewing shop. Thus, courts might overlook a claim based on the subordination of
women (through verbal harassment or though harsh maternity leave rules, for
example), because there were no men with which to compare them. Furthermore, a
court applying such a standard would force itself to overlook even the most blatantly
"sexual" incidents of sexual harassment, which the court would probably recognize in
other settings.
True, the Oncale court stated that "[tlhe critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."'' 29 Some lower
courts, however, seized this statement and have applied it with unwavering allegiance,
including in places where it clearly was not intended to apply. (In fact, Mr. Oncale
himself worked on an all-male, "eight-man crew."' 30 Why would the Supreme Court
remand that case for further consideration if the Court truly believed that Oncale must
prove that he was exposed to harassment to which women were not exposed?) These
courts overlook obvious forms of sexual harassment (which they would recognize
under any other circumstance) simply because the harasser harassed both men and
women-or presumably only women when there were no men-and thus the plaintiff
could not prove differing treatment of the sexes. Certainly, under the rationale adopted
by the Seventh Circuit in Holman, a female sweatshop worker in an all-female sewing
shop in Chicago might face a difficult time pursuing a Title VII claim against her male
supervisor, even for the most egregious forms of sexual harassment-be it "sexual" or
otherwise.
The Seventh Circuit has not addressed the issue of an all-female (or an all-male)
workplace since it handed down the Holman decision. Nevertheless, this case provides
another excellent example of a court drawing a line in the sand that excludes certain
causes of action as not based on sex. This line-drawing by courts is confusing and
unnecessary. Courts could eliminate some of the logical inconsistencies in current Title
VII law and draw unprotected groups under Title VII's protection by expanding the
types of claims that qualify as "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex."
Women in sweatshops face an inherently sexual form of harassment nearly everyday
at the workplace. Courts should allow sweatshop workers to seek remuneration for this
sexual harassment through a recognized cause of action under Title VII. To do this,
courts must expand their interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex."
Parts III and IV have shown the need for an expanded interpretation of
"discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex." Part V will now suggest a model for enacting
this expansion.

129. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
130. Id. at 77.
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V. How COURTS COULD EXPAND THE MEANING OF "DISCRIMINAT[ION]...
BECAUSE OF... SEX"

The Supreme Court left the language of what constitutes a Title VII cause of action
very open after Oncale. Since Oncale, lower courts understandably tried to define the
outer parameters of that cause of action; that is, lower courts-faced with real-life
plaintiffs and defendants quarreling whether a given defendant mistreated an3employee
1
because of sex-have tried to define who may sue and who may be sued.'
These courts are taking the Oncale decision in the wrong direction, however, and
they are failing to take full advantage of the potential broadness and flexibility of its
understanding of "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex." This Article will now
propose a new model: courts should accept the broadest possible interpretation of
"discriminat[ion] . . . because of... sex" and acknowledge causes of action for any
plaintiffs who allege anything logically tied to sex (in the broadest possible
interpretation of that word-including, but not limited to, sex, sexual conduct,
sexuality, gender, gender inequality, perpetuation of gender stereotypes, and
enforcement of gender norms). The goal of this new model is to clear up logical
inconsistencies between courts and expand Title VII to cover deserving yet
unprotected plaintiffs, without
"transform[ing] Title VII into a general civility code for
32
workplace."
American
the
Some courts, like Young (discussed above), 133 currently expend much time and
effort determining whether theirjurisdiction should accept "gender-based" harassment
claims as discrimination based on sex when the plaintiff cannot prove any "sexual"
conduct or language. Other courts, like Holman (also discussed above), 34 expend an
equal amount of effort deciding whether to accept sexual harassment claims based on
"sexual" conduct if plaintiffs fail to allege different treatment between the sexes. With
a broader interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex," courts need not
draw these arbitrary lines between cognizable and noncognizable claims. A
jurisprudence where courts accept both "gender-based" and "sexual" conduct-based
claims makes better logical sense than one that accepts one but not the other. There is
no reason why "sex" cannot mean both "sex" (as in sexual conduct or sexual desire)
and "sex" (as in gender).
The term "sex" in the phrase "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex" need not be
limited to narrow judicial interpretations. Support for this idea derives from legal
scholars such as John W. Whitehead, who, after Oncale, argued that the question of
whether a plaintiff alleges "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex" is a question of

131. See supra Part HI.
132. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. The defendant employers and their amici argued in Oncale that,
by extending Title VII protections into the same-sex arena, the Supreme Court would
"transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace." Id. This Article
recognizes the dangers that these parties warned of in Oncale; however, this Article also
recognizes that many deserving plaintiffs currently enjoy no protection under Title VII.
Therefore, I will argue for an interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex" that
expands the protections of Title VII while remaining mindful not to overexpand these
protections to the point that Title VH becomes a "civility code."
133. See supra notes 97-100, 107-08 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
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fact more properly answered by a jury than by a judge.' 35 Whitehead presents an
interesting argument that carries logical force, particularly in light of additional cases
interpreting Oncale that occurred after Whitehead finished his article. Courts have
shown a reluctance to understand some complaints by plaintiffs as "discriminat[ion]
...
because of... sex," where attorneys, legal scholars, and the plaintiffs themselves
thought otherwise. 136 According to Whitehead, the fact that the plaintiff "perceived
[that] the mistreatment was based on her sex" shows that "reasonable people might
have agreed with her."' 37 Thus, under Whitehead's analysis, courts would view the
interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ...because of ...sex" as a question of fact, and
Oncale would "limit the availability of summary judgment in cases of sexual
harassment."138
This Article has shown that there is a need for courts to broaden the interpretation
of "discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex." Placing more trust in juries to make this
determination may be one way to adjust Title VII law to comport with society's current
views about sex. 139
However, by placing the question entirely within the purview of the
jury, courts risk the possibility that a confused jury would award a judgment to a
plaintiff under the rubric of Title VII, where the plaintiffs claim more properly
belonged as an assault claim, for instance. Judges need not relinquish all control over
the interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ...because of ...sex." Instead, courts should
construe the determination of "discriminattion] ...because of... sex" as a mixed
question of law and fact, with judges interpreting the phrase very broadly and deferring
to juries whenever possible, but still retaining some limited summary judgment power.
Currently, "some courts do not shrink from judging [an alleged harasser's]
motive"'a0-that is, whether he discriminated because of sex.141 Courts should refrain
from this type of decisionmaking; courts should not step into the jury's shoes and
proclaim that a plaintiffs claim does not allege discrimination based on sex if the
plaintiff furthers an argument logically interpretable as based on sex. Regardless of
whether the court, in its own mind, more readily understands "discriminat[ion] ...
because of ...sex" to mean "gender-based harassment" or "sexual" conduct-based
harassment, the court should be cognizant that other forms of harassment might
reasonably be viewed by a jury as based on sex.
Rather, courts should exercise restraint, and dismiss a plaintiff s claim at summary
judgment only if a jury could not reasonably decide that the alleged harassment was

135. See Whitehead, supra note 98, at 799-803.
136. See id. at 800-03.
137. Id. at 800.
138. Id. at 799.
139. See id. at 800, 802-03.
140. Id. at 800. Whitehead keys on the harasser's motive, likely because many courts view
the harasser's motivation as relevant to whether he or she discriminated because of sex. See,
e.g., Young v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 11 F. Supp. 2d 921,927, 930 (S.D. Tex. 1998);
White v. Midwest Office Tech., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 936, 946-48 (D. Kan. 1998). However,
under the new model proposed in this Part, the harasser's motive is immaterial. Sexual
harassment is no less harmful and occurs no less "because of ...sex" whether the harasser
consciously wished to discriminate because of sex or whether his or her unconscious actions
affected someone more harshly because of sex.
141. See Whitehead, supra note 98, at 799-800.
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based on sex, while interpreting the word "sex" in a more all-encompassing manner, as
proposed above. Before ever dismissing a claim at summary judgment, courts should
remember that not all of society shares the same interpretation of "sex" as a federal
judge.
"[A] federal judge is not in the best position to define the current sexual tenor of
American culture in its many manifestations." Since "gender relations in the
workplace are rapidly evolving, and views of what is appropriate behavior are
diverse and shifting, a jury made up of a cross-section of our heterogeneous
communities provides the appropriate institution for deciding whether borderline
142
situations should be characterized as sexual harassment and retaliation."'
As guidance in applying this new summary judgment standard, courts should follow
the example of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas in White v.
Midwest Office Technology, Inc.143 to allow all "conduct that could be possibly
construed as gender-based by a reasonable fact-finder"' 44 to survive summary
judgment and proceed to the jury for the ultimate determination of whether the claim
constituted "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex." This statement shows the proper
mindset a court should adopt before deciding, as a matter of law, that no one could
reasonably understand the plaintiff's claim as based on sex.
Moreover, this new, broader interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ... because of...
sex" does not "transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American
workplace"' 145 for two reasons. First, even under this much more inclusive
interpretation.of "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex," courts still retain the power
to dismiss a claim at summary judgment if the plaintiff furthers no tenable argument
that the defendant discriminated because of sex. For example, in Kelm v. Arlington
Heights ParkDistrict,'6a discharged employee brought a sexual harassment suit after
he failed a random drug test. 147 In this case, the plaintiff himself failed to create an
argument that the defendant mistreated him because of sex. When the court pressed the
plaintiff to explain why he was discriminated against because of sex, he could not
coherently respond--drug tests are not sexual in nature, and the plaintiff was not
targeted for the random test because he was a man. The plaintiff basically could not
explain why the defendant's conduct had anything to do with sex (under even the
broadest understanding of that word). Thus, the court rightly granted summary
judgment in this case. The new model permits such an exercise of a court's summary
judgment power.
Second, this new model for interpreting "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex"
will not create a "civility code" because the plaintiff must still prove that he or she
endured harassment "severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or

142. Id. at 803 (quoting Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998)).
143. 5 F. Supp. 2d 936 (D. Kan. 1998).
144. Id. at 949; see Whitehead, supra note 98, at 802.
145. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); see supra note 132 and
accompanying text.
146. No. 98 C 4786, 2000 WL 263830 (N.D. Ill. March 1, 2000).
147. See id. at *5-6.
148. See id. at *6.
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abusive work environment." 149 The Oncale court offered this very argument: the severe
and pervasive standard should serve as a safeguard against penalizing "ordinary
socializing in the workplace."50 "Severe and pervasive" is in part a question of fact
suited for a jury, 15' and juries will stand as perfect watchdogs to ensure that plaintiffs'
claims-although broadly construed on the question of based on sex-will meet with
close scrutiny during jury deliberations.' 5 2 Juries are perfectly suited to answer the
"severe and pervasive" question-everyone works, everyone knows how coworkers
should be treated, everyone knows the difference between innocuous conversation and
harassment, and everyone knows a frivolous lawsuit when they see one. Thus,
plaintiffs' Title VII claims will not run amok and create a "civility code," because
plaintiffs still must satisfy the watchful and discriminating eye of the jury.
This model for a broader interpretation of "discriminat[ion]... because of... sex"
resolves some of the problems identified in Part III and Part IV of this Article. Part
III.A showed that, currently, logical inconsistencies exist in the reasoning that different
courts apply when deciding whether a plaintiff furthers a claim of harassment that is
based on sex. This model addressed this problem by including all possible
interpretations of the word "sex" within Title VII's purview. Thus, courts no longer
must draw lines and decide that plaintiffs who complain of "sexual" conduct-based
harassment have proven "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex" whereas plaintiffs

complaining of "gender-based harassment" have not, or vice versa. Hopefully, under
this model, courts will construe "discriminat[ion] . . . because of

. .

. sex" more

broadly, and rely more heavily on the common sense of juries to reward valid sexual
harassment claims and disregard invalid ones.
Moreover, this model addresses the deserving yet unprotected plaintiffs identified in
Parts III.B and IV. These Parts explained that, under a narrow interpretation of
"discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex," many groups of plaintiffs that face

systematic harassment at work currently enjoy no valid claims under Title VII, even
though the harassment these groups face undeniably can be traced back to the
employees' sex. Women in sweatshops face ruthless discrimination that can be tied to
their sex-verbal harassment designed to subordinate women to men, unreasonable
maternity leave, or inferior job assignments, for instance' 5 3-- but yet Parts III and IV
showed that these women might currently stand outside of Title VII's protection. Part
V's model for a broader interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex"
sweeps these women under Title VII's protection, and provides them with a powerful
cause of action to redress the wrongs inflicted against them at the workplace.

149. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
150. See id.
151. See Whitehead, supra note 98, at 799-800. However, as with the "discriminat[ion] ...
because of... sex" standard, courts often resolve claims at summary judgment because they fail
to meet the "severe and pervasive" standard. Id.; see, e.g., Sandvik v. Sec'y of Health & Human
Servs., 246 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2000)(unpublished table decision); White v. Midwest Office
Tech., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 936, 949 (D. Kan. 1998).
152. See Whitehead, supra note 98, at 802-03.
153. See supra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Construing the harassment that faces women in sweatshops as "discriminat[ion] ...
because of ... sex" forms just one step of many needed to actually improve these
women's lives. However, granting a downtrodden group legal rights in an area where
before they enjoyed none at all nudges the law in the right direction. Many legal
scholars have argued for a broader interpretation of "discriminat[ion] ... because of
... sex." The time has come for courts to make this move. A broader interpretation
might produce a more coherent Title VII jurisprudence; a broader interpretation will
protect more persons, including female sweatshop workers, who have been victimized
by discrimination because of their sex.

